Stock options business model

Contents

  1. Stock Options 101: The Essentials
  2. Employee Stock Option and Phantom Share Plans (Pool Size, Vesting Schedule Examples)
  3. How Do Stock Options Work? A Guide for Employees - Smartasset
  4. Post navigation

Dilutes EPS Executive investment is required May incent short-term stock-price manipulation Restricted Stock Outright grant of shares to executives with restrictions to sale, transfer, or pledging; shares forfeited if executive terminates employment; value of shares as restrictions lapse taxed as ordinary income Advantages Disadvantages Aligns executive and shareholder interests. No executive investment required. If stock appreciates after grant, company's tax deduction exceeds fixed charge to earnings. Immediate dilution of EPS for total shares granted.

Fair-market value charged to earnings over restriction period. Performance oriented. Company receives tax deduction at payout. Charge to earnings, marked to market. Difficulty in setting performance targets. When do Stock options work best? Appropriate for small companies where future growth is expected.

For publicly owned companies who want to offer some degree of company ownership to employees. What are important considerations when implementing Stock Options? How much stock a company be willing to sell. Who will receive the options. How many options are available to be sold in the future. Is this a permanent part of the benefit plan or just an incentive. Allows a company to share ownership with the employees.

In a down market, because they quickly become valueless Dilution of ownership Overstatement of operating income. Aligns executive and shareholder interests. And if something has value that can be lost, it has, by definition, downside risk.

Stock Options 101: The Essentials

In fact, options have even greater downside risk than stock. Consider two executives in the same company. One is granted a million dollars worth of stock, and the other is granted a million dollars worth of at-the-money options—options whose exercise price matches the stock price at the time of the grant. The executive with options, however, has essentially been wiped out.

His options are now so far under water that they are nearly worthless. Far from eliminating penalties, options actually amplify them. The downside risk has become increasingly evident to executives as their pay packages have come to be dominated by options. Take a look at the employment contract Joseph Galli negotiated with Amazon.

The risk inherent in options can be undermined, however, through the practice of repricing.

Employee Stock Option and Phantom Share Plans (Pool Size, Vesting Schedule Examples)

When a stock price falls sharply, the issuing company can be tempted to reduce the exercise price of previously granted options in order to increase their value for the executives who hold them. Although fairly common in small companies—especially those in Silicon Valley—option repricing is relatively rare for senior managers of large companies, despite some well-publicized exceptions.

Again, however, the criticism does not stand up to close examination. For a method of compensation to motivate managers to focus on the long term, it needs to be tied to a performance measure that looks forward rather than backward. The traditional measure—accounting profits—fails that test. It measures the past, not the future. Stock price, however, is a forward-looking measure.

How Do Stock Options Work? A Guide for Employees - Smartasset

Forecasts can never be completely accurate, of course. But because investors have their own money on the line, they face enormous pressure to read the future correctly. That makes the stock market the best predictor of performance we have. But what about the executive who has a great long-term strategy that is not yet fully appreciated by the market? Or, even worse, what about the executive who can fool the market by pumping up earnings in the short run while hiding fundamental problems? Investors may be the best forecasters we have, but they are not omniscient.

Option grants provide an effective means for addressing these risks: slow vesting. That delay serves to reward managers who take actions with longer-term payoffs while exacting a harsh penalty on those who fail to address basic business problems. Stock options are, in short, the ultimate forward-looking incentive plan—they measure future cash flows, and, through the use of vesting, they measure them in the future as well as in the present.

If a company wants to encourage a more farsighted perspective, it should not abandon option grants—it should simply extend their vesting periods. Their directors and executives assume that the important thing is just to have a plan in place; the details are trivial. As a result, they let their HR departments or compensation consultants decide on the form of the plan, and they rarely examine the available alternatives. While option plans can take many forms, I find it useful to divide them into three types.

The first two—what I call fixed value plans and fixed number plans—extend over several years.

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The third—megagrants—consists of onetime lump sum distributions. The three types of plans provide very different incentives and entail very different risks. With fixed value plans, executives receive options of a predetermined value every year over the life of the plan. Fixed value plans are popular today.

Fixed value plans are therefore ideal for the many companies that set executive pay according to studies performed by compensation consultants that document how much comparable executives are paid and in what form. But fixed value plans have a big drawback. Because they set the value of future grants in advance, they weaken the link between pay and performance.

Executives end up receiving fewer options in years of strong performance and high stock values and more options in years of weak performance and low stock values. The stock price has doubled; the number of options John receives has been cut in half. He ends up, in other words, being given a much larger piece of the company that he appears to be leading toward ruin. For that reason, fixed value plans provide the weakest incentives of the three types of programs. I call them low-octane plans. Whereas fixed value plans stipulate an annual value for the options granted, fixed number plans stipulate the number of options the executive will receive over the plan period.

Under a fixed number plan, John would receive 28, at-the-money options in each of the three years, regardless of what happened to the stock price. Here, obviously, there is a much stronger link between pay and performance. Since the value of at-the-money options changes with the stock price, an increase in the stock price today increases the value of future option grants.

Likewise, a decrease in stock price reduces the value of future option grants. Since fixed number plans do not insulate future pay from stock price changes, they create more powerful incentives than fixed value plans.


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I call them medium-octane plans, and, in most circumstances, I recommend them over their fixed value counterparts. Now for the high-octane model: the lump-sum megagrant.

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While not as common as the multiyear plans, megagrants are widely used among private companies and post-IPO high-tech companies, particularly in Silicon Valley. Megagrants are the most highly leveraged type of grant because they not only fix the number of options in advance, they also fix the exercise price. Shifts in stock price have a dramatic effect on this large holding. Every few years since , Eisner has received a megagrant of several million shares. Since the idea behind options is to gain leverage and since megagrants offer the most leverage, you might conclude that all companies should abandon multi-year plans and just give high-octane megagrants.

When viewed in those terms, megagrants have a big problem.

Look at what happened to John in our third scenario. After two years, his megagrant was so far under water that he had little hope of making much money on it, and it thus provided little incentive for boosting the stock value. And he was not receiving any new at-the-money options to make up for the worthless ones—as he would have if he were in a multiyear plan. It would provide him with a strong motivation to quit, join a new company, and get some new at-the-money options.

Ironically, the companies that most often use megagrants—high-tech start-ups—are precisely those most likely to endure such a worst-case scenario. Their stock prices are highly volatile, so extreme shifts in the value of their options are commonplace. And since their people are in high demand, they are very likely to head for greener pastures when their megagrants go bust. Indeed, Silicon Valley is full of megagrant companies that have experienced human resources crises in response to stock price declines.

Such companies must choose between two bad alternatives: they can reprice their options, which undermines the integrity of all future option plans and upsets shareholders, or they can refrain from repricing and watch their demoralized employees head out the door. Silicon Valley companies could avoid many such situations by using multiyear plans. The answer lies in their heritage. Before going public, start-ups find the use of megagrants highly attractive. Accounting and tax rules allow them to issue options at significantly discounted exercise prices. The risk profile of these pre-IPO grants is actually closer to that of shares of stock than to the risk profile of what we commonly think of as options.

When they go public, the companies continue to use megagrants out of habit and without much consideration of the alternatives. But now they issue at-the-money options. What had been an effective way to reward key people suddenly has the potential to demotivate them or even spur them to quit. Some high-tech executives claim that they have no choice—they need to offer megagrants to attract good people.

Yet in most cases, a fixed number grant of comparable value would provide an equal enticement with far less risk. With a fixed number grant, after all, you still guarantee the recipient a large number of options; you simply set the exercise prices for portions of the grant at different intervals.

By staggering the exercise prices in this way, the value of the package becomes more resilient to drops in the stock price.